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Abstract
As emergence and spread of multi-drug resistant organisms (MDRO) requires a standardized preventive approach,
we aimed to evaluate current MDRO admission screening practices in Swiss hospitals and to identify potential
barriers impeding their implementation. In early 2018, all Swiss public and private healthcare institutions providing
inpatient care were contacted with a 34-item questionnaire to investigate current MDRO admission screening
policies. Among 139 respondents representing 180 institutions (response rate, 79%), 83% (149) of institutions
implemented MDRO admission screening, while 28% of private and 9% of public institutions did not perform any
screening. Targeted high-risk screening included carbapenemase producers, extended-spectrum beta-lactamase
producers and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus at the institutional level for respectively 78% (115), 81%
(118) and 98% (145) of screening institutions. Vancomycin-resistant enterococci (44% of institutions), multi-resistant
Acinetobacter baumanii (41%) and Pseudomonas aeruginosa (37%) were systematically searched only by a minority
of screening institutions. A large diversity of risk factors for targeted screening and some heterogeneity in body
sites screened were also observed. Admission-screening practices were mostly impeded by a difficulty to identify
high-risk patients (44%) and non-compliance of healthcare workers (35%). Heterogeneous practices and gaps in
small and privately-owned institutions, as well as a mismatch between current epidemiologic MDRO trends and
screening practices were noticed. These results highlight the need for uniform national MDRO screening standards.
Keywords: Infection prevention and control, Contact isolation, Admission screening, Enterobacteriaceae, Multi-drug
resistant, Carbapenem-resistant, Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase, Cross-infection, Survey
Introduction
Early detection of multi-drug resistant organisms
(MDRO) carriage upon admission could allow timely
implementation of infection control measures and the
appropriate selection of empiric antimicrobial therapy
[1]. Few nationwide surveys investigated real-life MDRO
screening practices upon admission [2–5]. In 2010, an
unpublished survey conducted in Swiss intensive care
units (ICUs) revealed heterogeneous MDRO screening
practices. Endemicity among MDROs in Switzerland dif-
fers according to community or hospital settings.
ESBL-producing Escherichia coli is considered as en-
demic in the general population, especially in the institu-
tionalized elderly (extended-spectrum beta-lactamase
(ESBL) E.coli prevalence of 22% among clinical isolates
from nursing homes in 2017) [6], whereas acute care hos-
pitals also consider methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) - despite decreasing trends - (prevalence
of 8% among clinical S. aureus isolates in 2014) [7] and
ESBL-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae as endemic (7.7%
of ESC-R invasive isolates in 2017) [8]. The emergence
and spread of MDRO requires a standardized preventive
approach on a national scale. We therefore evaluated
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current MDRO admission screening practices in Swiss
hospitals and identified potential barriers impeding their
implementation.
Methods
From January to March 2018, a nation-wide 34-item
questionnaire was sent to 228 Swiss public and private
healthcare institutions providing inpatient acute care.
Psychiatric institutions, nursing homes, palliative care
and pain therapy centers were excluded. Three re-
minders as well as a phone call were addressed to each
non-responding institution.
The survey was translated in the three official lan-
guages, pre-tested locally and shared through the online
platform SurveyMonkey® (see French and German ver-
sions of the Online Survey, Additional files 1 and 2). We
collected information about the characteristics of each
hospital, in addition to current practices concerning uni-
versal and targeted MDRO screening for patients at-risk
at admission, risk factors considered for targeted screen-
ing, body sites for sampling swabs and cultures, preemp-
tive contact precautions for high-risk patients, the
presence of local guidelines and problems faced to im-
plement on-admission screening.
All analyses were institution-based (n = 180) and not
respondent-based (n = 139), since some respondents were
in charge of several institutions. Data were extracted from
the online platform to an Excel® spread-sheet, checked for
accuracy and exported for descriptive analysis using
STATA 15.0® (StataCorp LLC, College Station, TX).
Results
Overall, 139 respondents, mainly nurses (56%) and physi-
cians (37%) replied for 180 institutions (response rate,
79%), with 57% from public institutions and 61% from
small-size (< 200 beds), 21% medium-size, and 18%
large-size institutions (> 500 beds). All non-responders
were small-size institutions. The majority of hospitals
(72%) was located in the Swiss-German part. Eighty-three
percent of institutions (149) implemented some type of
MDRO admission screening, while 28% of private and 9%
of public institutions did not perform any screening. Uni-
versal MRSA screening of all admitted patients was not
performed on an institutional level by any hospital, except
for a few specific units in 6% of screening institutions. Tar-
geted high-risk screening at the institutional level included
carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE),
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae and MRSA, which
were monitored by 78% (n = 115), 81% (n = 118) and 98%
(n = 145) of hospitals, respectively (Table 1).
Vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) (44%),
multi-resistant Acinetobacter baumanii (41%) and Pseudo-
monas aeruginosa (37%) were systematically searched only
by a minority of institutions with on-admission screening
programs, without differences between small and large
institutions.
Frequently used risk factors to screen patients consid-
ered at high risk for MDRO carriage were “known car-
riers”, “hospitalization abroad” and a “direct transfer
from abroad” (Table 2). Other risk factors are heteroge-
neously recognized among institutions. Of note, few
hospitals (19%) systematically screen patients who have
been transferred from other Swiss hospitals for VRE car-
riage, despite increasing VRE rates and ongoing out-
breaks in Switzerland.
Heterogeneity subsists on the choice of body site sam-
pling. Nares (99%), throat (81%) and inguinal sampling
(91%) are leading body sites to screen for MRSA, whereas
anal or rectal swabs are most frequently used for ESBL
(89%), CPE (94%) or VRE (88%) screening. However, in
some centers, inguinal screening was also performed for
enteric bacteria. For MDR-A. baumanii and P. aeruginosa,
a large variety of body sites were screened (anal, rectal, in-
guinal, throat or nasal swabs). For high-risk patients, only
Table 1 Targeted high-risk MDRO screening among public and private hospitals in Switzerland
ESBL CPE MDR-Acinetobacter MDR-Pseudomonas VRE MRSA
Targeted screening (%)
Public (n = 102)a:
Institutional: 82 (89%) 77 (83%) 37 (40%) 36 (39%) 38 (41%) 93 (100%)
Only in certain units: 0 0 1 (1%) 2 (2%) 4 (4%) 0
None: 10 (11%) 16 (17%) 55 (59%) 55 (59%) 51 (55%) 0
Private (n = 78)b:
Institutional: 36 (67%) 38 (70%) 23 (43%) 18 (33%) 27 (50%) 52 (95%)
Only in certain units: 4 (7%) 4 (8%) 2 (4%) 8 (15%) 3 (6%) 3 (5%)
None: 14 (26%) 12 (22%) 28 (53%) 28 (52%) 24 (44%) 0
Abbreviations: ESBL extended-spectrum beta-lactamase, CPE carbapenemase-producing enterobacteriaceae, MDR multi-drug resistant, VRE vancomycin-resistant
enterococcus, MRSA methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus
aMissing values for: ESBL = 10, CPE = 9, Acinetobacter baumanii = 9, Pseudomonas aeruginosa = 9, VRE = 9 and MRSA = 9
bMissing values for: ESBL = 24, CPE = 24, Acinetobacter baumanii = 25, Pseudomonas aeruginosa = 24, VRE = 24 and MRSA = 23
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23% (33/142) of hospitals routinely performed repeat
swabs in case of one negative screening result. A total of
90% (86/96) of ICUs implemented pre-emptive contact
precautions, including placement in a single room in 63%
of ICUs.
Despite local recommendations for admission screen-
ing provided by 96% (137/142) of hospitals, these prac-
tices were mostly impeded by a difficulty to identify
high-risk patients (44%) and non-compliance of health-
care workers (35%). Reimbursement issues were less
commonly cited as an obstacle (15%).
Discussion
This nation-wide survey to examine current practices of
MDRO admission screening was answered by 180 insti-
tutions, representing an excellent response rate and the
diversity of healthcare institutions in Switzerland, among
public and private institutions of different sizes. This
survey revealed good compliance with on-admission
MDRO screening practices in larger acute-care hospitals,
but also important gaps in small and private institutions.
This survey differs from previous national surveys
evaluating MDRO screening practices at admission,
mainly because of its higher response rate and the
reporting of both risk factors and body sites sampled ac-
cording to MDRO species [2–5]. Only one national sur-
vey performed in France in 2012 addressed public and
private healthcare facilities. This survey observed that
only 34% of 286 institutions reported management of
patients at-risk at the time of admission [3].
A mismatch between the current epidemiologic situ-
ation and screening practices was noticed with a dispro-
portionate focus on MRSA (in particular in patients
transferred from the French and Italian speaking parts of
Switzerland) and a lack of awareness of possible spread
of A. baumanii, P. aeruginosa and VRE by unknown
carriers, including patients transferred within
Switzerland. Indeed, nosocomial MRSA incidence has
been declining, whereas VRE rates are rapidly increasing
[7, 9, 10]. In addition, severe nosocomial outbreaks of A.
baumanii infections linked to imported cases have oc-
curred in Switzerland in the past [11]. Therefore, targeted
high-risk screening should also include other MDROs be-
side MRSA.
A recent travel history to foreign countries without
hospitalisation was rarely used as a risk factor to define
high-risk patients eligible for screening at admission
(23–29% of institutions according to the type of MDRO).
This policy concerned in particular South-Asian coun-
tries with hyperendemic MDRO occurrence, such as
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. A re-
cent travel history to North America or U.S. citizenship
were not considered as risk factors by any Swiss institu-
tion, despite increasing importation of community
MRSA into Switzerland [12].
Heterogeneity was also observed among risk factors
considered for targeted screening, probably due to a lack
of national consensus on multiple criteria supporting
surveillance programs. Adding to this complexity, actual
controversies addressing admission screening policies
support the requirement for updated and uniform stan-
dards: species to be screened, risk factors considered for
targeted screening, number of screening swabs to be
performed at admission, among others. Interestingly,
cost considerations did not play an important role in
implementing MDRO screening policies.
This survey has limitations. First, we were unable to per-
form external validation of the respondents’ answers. Sec-
ond, this survey did cover neither screening practices
beyond the admission procedure nor variability in MDRO
control measures or laboratory detection methods. Third,
the design of the study did not allow correlating MDRO
Table 2 Patient-level risk factors considered for targeted MDRO screening upon admission
ESBL
(n = 122)
CPE
(n = 119)
MDR-Acinetobacter
(n = 62)a
MDR-Pseudomonas
(n = 63)a
VRE
(n = 72)
MRSA
(n = 148)
(n = number of centers performing a targeted screening for each pathogen)
Risk factors used for targeted admission screening (%)
Known MDRO patient: 111 (91%) 111 (93%) 59 (95%) 60 (95%) 67 (93%) 143 (97%)
Direct transfer from abroad: 114 (93%) 107 (90%) 41 (66%) 37 (59%) 54 (75%) 144 (97%)
Direct transfer from Switzerlandb: 33 (27%) 29 (24%) 13 (21%) 14 (22%) 14 (19%) 71 (48%)
Transfer from a long term care facility: 11 (9%) 7 (6%) 3 (5%) 4 (6%) 5 (7%) 32 (22%)
Hospitalization abroad in the recent pastc: 103 (84%) 98 (82%) 37 (59%) 32 (51%) 47 (65%) 109 (74%)
Travel in a country with endemic MDRO: 28 (23%) 34 (29%) 16 (25%) 18 (29%) 19 (26%) 35 (24%)
Other: 38 (31%) 41 (34%) 23 (37%) 21 (33%) 21 (29%) 84 (57%)
Abbreviations: ESBL extended-spectrum beta-lactamase, CPE carbapenemase-producing enterobacteriaceae, MDR multi-drug resistant, VRE vancomycin resistant
enterococcus, MRSA methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus
aMissing values for: MDR Acinetobacter baumanii = 1, MDR Pseudomonas aeruginosa = 1
bMainly Western Switzerland and Tessin were targeted when considering a direct transfer from Switzerland
cVarying timeframes considered as recent past, mainly from 6 to 12 months
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screening practices to nosocomial MDRO transmission
rates.
In summary, these results highlight the need for uniform
national MDRO screening standards. It also demonstrates
a lack of awareness about current MDRO trends, focusing
on MRSA rather than VRE or gram-negative MDROs, and
ongoing confusion about risk factors that might be ad-
dressed through uniform national standards. Harmonized,
clear and accessible guidelines – which are already avail-
able in some countries – could support standardization of
risk factors used for targeted admission screening and of
sample sites for admission screening [13, 14].
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